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THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE AND THE 
WIKILEAKS CONTROVERSY: NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
  
JEROME A. BARRON † 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n this Essay, I will focus on two clashes between national security 
and the First Amendment—the first is the Pentagon Papers case, 
the second is the WikiLeaks controversy.1 I shall first discuss the 
Pentagon Papers case. 
 The Pentagon Papers case began with Daniel Ellsberg,2 a 
former Vietnam War supporter who became disillusioned with the 
war. Ellsberg first worked for the Rand Corporation, which has 
strong associations with the Defense Department, and in 1964, he 
worked in the Pentagon under then-Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara.3 He then served as a civilian government employee for 
the U.S. State Department in Vietnam4 before returning to the United 
 
        †    Harold H. Greene Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law 
School (1998–present); Dean, The George Washington University Law School (1979–
1988); B.A., Tufts University; J.D., Yale Law School; LL.M., The George Washington 
University. This Essay is based in part on a presentation I made to the American Constitu-
tion Society for Law and Policy in Washington, D.C. on November 15, 2010. I would also 
like to thank Leslie Lee, Assistant Director of Administration at the Jacob Burns Law Li-
brary, for her bibliographic assistance and Winifred Hercules for her excellent secretarial 
assistance. 
 1.  See infra Parts V–VIII. 
 2.  See DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE 
PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 33 (1996) (arguing the Pentagon Papers never would have leaked 
but for Daniel Ellsberg). 
 3.  Id. at 35. 
 4.  Id. at 36. 
I 
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States in 1967 to work for the Rand Corporation.5 Rand, as it hap-
pened, was asked by Secretary McNamara to prepare a report on the 
history of American military involvement from 1944 to 1968.6 In 
1969, Daniel Ellsberg and another Rand employee copied the classi-
fied documents, which later came to be known as the Pentagon Pa-
pers, and then shared them with the New York Times.7 In June 1971, 
the Times published “a secret, classified Pentagon Report outlining 
the process by which America went to war with Vietnam.”8 The U.S. 
government then asked a newly appointed federal district court 
judge, Murray Gurfein of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, to issue a temporary restraining order against 
the New York Times.9 Judge Gurfein refused. He declared, “A can-
tankerous press, an obstinate press, an ubiquitous press must be suf-
fered by those in authority in order to preserve the even greater val-
ues of freedom of expression and the right of the people to know.”10 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,11 
ruling that the issue of whether the Pentagon Papers should be pub-
lished should await “further hearings when the government could 
develop and support its position that the publication of the papers 
presented a threat to the security of the United States.”12 Until this 
could happen, the New York Times would be restrained from further 
publication of the Pentagon Papers. 
 
 5.  TOM WELLS, WILD MAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF DANIEL ELLSBERG 271 (2001). 
 6.  See SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS:AN ACCOUNT OF THE LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE PENTAGON PAPERS 40 (1972) (stating that the Rand Cor-
poration was selected to prepare the report because it was a Department of Defense reposi-
tory). 
 7.  See, e.g., Marian Wang, Pentagon Papers Reporter: What the WikiLeaks ‘War 
Logs’ Tells Us, PROPUBLICA (July 26, 2010, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/sheehan-interview. 
 8.  DONALD M. GILLMOR & JEROME A. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW: CASES 
AND COMMENT 113 (2d ed. 1974). 
 9.  United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(refusing to continue current restraining order and denying injunction, but allowing tempo-
rary restraining order to continue pending appeal), rev’d per curiam and remanded with in-
structions, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 942, rev’d per curiam, New York 
Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 10.    Id. at 331. 
     11.  GILLMOR & BARRON, supra note 8, at 113 (citing United States v. New York 
Times Co., 444 F.2d 544, 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), rev’d per curiam, Pentagon Pa-
pers, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). 
 12.  Id. 
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 In the meantime, the Washington Post sought to publish the 
Papers as well.13 Accordingly, the United States sought an injunction 
against the Post in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.14 There, Judge Gerhard Gesell rejected the government’s request 
for injunctive relief and the federal appeals court in Washington af-
firmed.15 This meant that the Washington Post was free to publish 
without fear of government intervention but the New York Times was 
not. Other papers such as the Boston Globe, the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, the Chicago Sun-Times, and the Los Angeles Times also 
published portions of the Pentagon Papers.16 The government sought 
and obtained injunctive relief against the Boston Globe and the St. 
Louis Post Dispatch, but did not proceed against the Chicago Sun 
Times or the Los Angeles Times.17 
 The Supreme Court decision in the Pentagon Papers case 
was a clear defeat for government claims of national security and an 
equally clear victory for freedom of the press. The Pentagon Papers 
case is one of the great First Amendment cases, and yet the famous 
decision was only a per curiam opinion that contained just twenty-six 
lines.18 Of those, only six lines dealt with a substantive First 
Amendment principle.19 The Court relied on the doctrine of prior re-
straint and declared that a prior restraint comes before the Supreme 
Court “bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.”20 Further-
more, the government bears a heavy burden in order to justify such a 
restraint.21 The Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that the government had 
“not met that burden.”22  
 Why was such an important case a per curiam opinion in the 
first place? The answer seems to be that there was no time for the 
usual opinion process to be followed. Usually, the Chief Justice 
would assign the opinion to one of the Justices, the opinion would be 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See id. at 113–14 (stating that the Globe and the Post-Dispatch only published one 
article regarding the Pentagon Papers as the government later obtained restraining orders 
against each; but the Chicago Sun-Times and the Los Angeles Times were never subject to 
any restraining orders after publishing their articles). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
 19.  See id.  
 20.  Id. (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
 21. See id. (citing Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70). 
 22. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714. 
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circulated, and the Justices would make their comments with respect 
to corrections, revisions, deletions, and additions.23 However, there 
was no time for standard procedure. In response to the national furor 
that publication of the Pentagon Papers occasioned, the Court gave 
the case expedited review.24 
 In the Pentagon Papers case there were nine opinions.25 There 
could hardly have been more. Yet a fundamental point shines 
through the separate opinions. Each of the Justices thought there 
should be some judicial role in considering collisions between na-
tional security and the First Amendment.26 There were, of course, in-
tense differences of opinion among them about the extent of judicial 
involvement. 
 
I. JUSTICES BLACK, 
DOUGLAS, AND BRENNAN, AND FIRST AMENDMENT 
ABSOLUTISM 
 
 To show the deep differences of opinion on the Court, one 
only has to contrast Justice Hugo Black’s separate opinion with those 
of most of his colleagues. Justice Black’s First Amendment absolut-
ism was evident in every sentence of his opinion. He wrote, “[e]very 
moment’s continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers 
amounts to a flagrant, indefensible and continuing violation of the 
First Amendment.”27 He was shocked that, as he put it,  “some of 
[his] brethren [were] apparently willing to hold that publication of 
news may sometimes be enjoined.”28 On this point, he was quite cor-
rect. Some of the Justices he was referring to were among the six 
who joined him in upholding the denial of the government’s request 
for an injunctive relief against the press. 
 The only Justice who took a categorically absolutist position 
on the First Amendment was Justice Black. He gave no weight to 
 
 23.  See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 259 (First Vintage Books 
ed., Random House 2002) (1987). 
 24.  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 942 (1971) (granting certiorari to 
the Supreme Court and setting oral argument for the following day).  
 25.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713–63. 
 26. Michael J. Gaffney, Legal and Constitutional Issues, in INSIDE THE PENTAGON 
PAPERS 197, 200 (John Prados & Margaret Pratt Porter eds., 2004) (citing Pentagon Papers, 
403 U.S. at 714). 
 27.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 715 (Black, J., concurring). 
 28.  Id. 
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claims of national security even when supported by those parts of the 
Constitution that impose specific responsibilities on the executive, 
which might run counter to extending full protection to First 
Amendment claims.29 All such arguments, said Justice Black, seek to 
support a holding that “despite the First Amendment’s emphatic 
command, the Executive branch, the Congress, and the Judiciary can 
make laws enjoining publication of current news and abridging free-
dom of the press in the name of ‘national security.’”30 Furthermore, 
“[t]he word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours 
should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in 
the First Amendment.”31 Indeed, he was arguing that all the security 
that the nation needs is provided by the guarantees of freedom of 
speech and press.32 I doubt there is a single Justice on the Supreme 
Court today who would take Justice Black’s position. 
 Justice Black exempted the opinions of Justices William 
Brennan and William Douglas from his surprise that some of the Jus-
tices were willing to hold that the press might sometimes be en-
joined. Justice Douglas’s view is in fact equally categorical: the First 
Amendment leaves “no room for government restraint on the 
press.”33 However, unlike Justice Black, he felt it necessary to exam-
ine the Espionage Act to see if there was any merit to the govern-
ment’s position that “the word ‘communicates’ is broad enough to 
encompass publication.”34 He concluded that there was not.35 Since 
no statute authorized the executive branch’s action, any authority for 
granting injunctive relief against the press must flow from its “inher-
 
 29.  JAMES J. MAGEE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: ABSOLUTIST OF THE COURT 26 (1980). 
 30.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 718 (Black, J., concurring). 
 31.  Id. at 719. 
 32.  See Gaffney, supra note 26, at 199 (citing Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 719). 
 33.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
 34.  Id. at 721 (interpreting the text of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) within the Espionage Act 
and finding that “communicates” does not include “publishes”). Section 793(e) of the Es-
pionage Act states “[w]hoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over 
any document, writing . . . or information relating to the national defense which information 
the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the 
advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates . . . the same to any person not en-
titled to receive it . . . .[s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 
ten years, or both.” If “communicates” did mean “publishes,” then the government’s claim 
that publishers of the New York Times were in violation of the Espionage Act would have 
had greater force. 
 35.  Id.; see also Gaffney, supra note 26, at 199. 
V._JB_FINAL READ_NT'L SEC. & FA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2011  11:10 AM 
52 WAKE FOREST JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:1 
ent power.”36 Such power might exist if it was preceded by a con-
gressional declaration of war.37 However, Congress had not issued a 
declaration of war with respect to Vietnam and presidential wars 
were not authorized. Therefore, there was no case for “inherent 
power” either.38  However, suppose that serious adverse conse-
quences flowed from press disclosure of the contents of the Pentagon 
Papers. That surely would be no basis for upholding a prior restraint 
on the press in Justice Douglas’ view: “The dominant purpose of the 
First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of gov-
ernment suppression of embarrassing information.”39 
 Justice Brennan was clear how the case should be resolved: 
“[T]he First Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the imposition 
of judicial restraints in circumstances of the kind presented by these 
cases.”40 In his concurrence Justice Brennan conceded that some of 
the restraints issued by the courts below may have been warranted 
given the unavoidable haste in which those decisions were reached.41 
This was so particularly in light of the fact that “never before [had] 
the United States sought to enjoin a newspaper from publishing in-
formation in its possession.”42 Justice Brennan objected that the gov-
ernment’s request for injunctive relief was based on the possibility of 
prejudice to the “national interest.”43 However, there was only one 
justification for a prior restraint and that was during war. 44 The 
American military intervention in Vietnam was not preceded by a 
formal declaration of war. This was true also of the Gulf War, the in-
vasion of Iraq, and our present military engagement in Afghanistan; 
all were undeclared. 
 Brennan did not deal with the issue of the constitutional     
validity of prior restraints against the press during undeclared wars. 
However, he did observe that even in the case of a nuclear holocaust, 
the executive branch “must inevitably submit the basis upon which 
 
 36.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 722; see also Gaffney, supra note 26, at 199. 
 37.  See Gaffney, supra note 26, at 198 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 
(1931)) (finding the Court may allow for exceptions in government action during times of 
war). 
 38.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 722. 
 39.  Id. at 723. 
 40.  Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 726 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). 
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that aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary.”45 The courts were not 
to take the word of the executive; they were obliged to demand 
proof. In First Amendment cases of this nature, the courts, not the 
executive, were to have the last word.46 
 For Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan, the First Amend-
ment trumped national security considerations when the government 
was seeking injunctive relief against the press. However, for the 
other three Justices who comprised the Pentagon Papers majority—
Stewart, Marshall and White—reconciling the conflict of national 
security versus freedom of the press was far more difficult to resolve. 
 
 
II. JUSTICES STEWART, 
MARSHALL, AND WHITE AND THE RULE OF LAW THEME 
 
 Justice Stewart observed that in the age of nuclear power, the 
President of the United States has much greater “constitutional inde-
pendence” in areas of national defense and foreign relations than 
does the prime minister of a country with a parliamentary system of 
government.47 Critical public opinion is the only real restraint on the 
President’s actions in these areas.48 Furthermore, he said, critical 
public opinion is dependent upon a press that is “alert, aware, and 
free.”49 
 On the other hand, national defense and international rela-
tions “require both confidentiality and secrecy.”50 How then to re-
solve the dilemma between the government’s need for confidentiality 
and the people’s dependence on a free press? For Justice Stewart the 
answer was clear, “The responsibility must be where the power is.”51 
The executive should resolve the dilemma: it is for the president “to 
determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary” for 
the exercise of his defense and foreign affairs responsibilities.52  The 
role for Congress in these circumstances is to enact “specific and ap-
 
 45.  Id. at 727. 
 46.  Id. at 726–27. 
 47.  Id. at 727–28 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 729. 
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propriate criminal laws to protect government property and preserve 
government secrets.”53 Congress had in fact passed such criminal 
laws relevant to the facts of this case.54 If the government chose to 
prosecute under this legislation, then the courts would have to deter-
mine whether this legislation was applicable.55  
 At this point, we should stop and ask what Justice Stewart 
was suggesting. He was making the following argument: under exist-
ing legislation—presumably the Espionage Act—criminal charges 
could be brought against Katherine Graham, publisher of the Wash-
ington Post and Arthur Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times. 
To even entertain such a suggestion takes us into an entirely different 
First Amendment paradigm than that shared by Justices Black and 
Douglas. Furthermore, Justice Stewart argued that if Congress were 
to pass a law authorizing a civil suit, say, which permitted the gov-
ernment to enjoin the press in the interests of national security, then 
the courts would have to determine the applicability of the facts of 
the case to the hypothetical statute as well as the constitutionality of 
such a law.56 
 However, Congress had not passed a law governing the facts 
of the Pentagon Papers case. In such circumstances, Justice Stewart 
believed it was wrong to ask the courts to decide the dilemma of na-
tional security versus freedom of the press.57 It is the job of the      
executive to decide the issue. The executive is undoubtedly correct 
that some of the Pentagon Papers should be kept secret “in the na-
tional interest.”58 But then, Justice Stewart did a turnabout. He said 
he could not say that any of these documents would result in irrepa-
rable injury to the nation.59 (Irreparable injury is the standard that 
courts use to decide whether injunctive relief should lie.60) Since 
there was no irreparable injury, under the First Amendment, the only 
resolution possible was to deny the injunctive relief sought by the 
government. Therefore, it would appear Justice Stewart did not truly 
 
 53.  Id. at 730. 
 54.  Id. (explaining that such laws included the protection of government property, the 
scope of which is relevant to the issues presented in the cases at hand). 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Execu-
tive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 363–64 (1986). 
 58.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 730. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  E.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506 (1959). 
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believe that resolving the clash between national security and free-
dom of the press in the Pentagon Papers case was a presidential re-
sponsibility to which the courts must defer. 
 The theme of Justice Marshall’s opinion in the Pentagon Pa-
pers case is the importance of the rule of law. The “ultimate issue” in 
the Pentagon Papers case was “whether this Court or the Congress 
has the power to make law.”61 For Marshall, it was very clear that the 
Constitution does not permit “the courts and the Executive Branch” 
to make law where Congress has not done so.62 Justice Marshall rea-
soned that this was not a situation where Congress simply neglected 
to provide a remedy to a serious problem.63 In the past, Congress had 
provided the “Executive with broad power to protect the Nation from 
disclosure of damaging state secrets.”64 
 Justice Marshall pointed out that the Espionage Act provided 
that anyone who had unauthorized possession of information injuri-
ous to the United States and who “willfully communicates” it to a 
person not entitled to receive it would be subject to criminal sanc-
tion.65 Under this interpretation, the publishers of the Washington 
Post and the New York Times could have been prosecuted, and if 
found guilty, fined or jailed or both. Justice Marshall conceded, 
however, that the meaning of the word “communicates” in the statute 
did not refer to “publication of newspaper stories.”66 Justice Marshall 
then went on to point to various proposals that had been made to 
Congress to make “the conduct engaged in here unlawful” and which 
would have given “the President the power that he seeks in this 
case.”67 However, he acknowledged that Congress had refused to en-
act them.68 
 
 61.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 62.  Id. at 742. Counsel for the New York Times wisely pressed this point. Floyd 
Abrams, who was co-counsel with Professor Alexander Bickel in the Pentagon Papers case 
and whose reflections appear elsewhere in this issue, has observed that the bulk of their brief 
to Judge Gurfein in the federal district court case stressed that there was no statutory basis 
for the government’s attempt to secure injunctive relief against the Times. See FLOYD 
ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY 23 (2005) (stating that the government failed to demonstrate 
that the Times had violated any statute); see also Floyd Abrams, The Pentagon Papers After 
Four Decades, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 7 (2011). 
 63.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 743. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 745 (citing the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2006)). 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. at 746. 
 68.  Id. at 745–46. 
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 Justice White’s opinion emphasized a theme Justice Stewart 
had sounded as well. Congress had in fact passed criminal laws rele-
vant to the facts of this case. Justice White noted that Section 798 of 
the Espionage Act proscribed “knowing and willful publication of 
any classified information concerning the cryptographic systems or 
communication intelligence activities of the United States as well as 
any information obtained from communication intelligence opera-
tions.”69 What he was really saying was that Katherine Graham, pub-
lisher of the Washington Post, and Arthur Sulzberger, publisher of 
the New York Times, could be prosecuted under this and kindred pro-
visions of the Espionage Act. Justice White was quite blunt here: “I 
would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions under these sec-
tions on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the 
imposition of a prior restraint.”70 
 However, the fact was the government had not chosen to 
prosecute under the Espionage Act. Nonetheless, the government’s 
position was that the inherent constitutional powers of Congress and 
the judiciary provided the constitutional basis to issue an injunc-
tion—a prior restraint—against the press in these circumstances.71 
Unlike Justice Black, Justice White would not say that the First 
Amendment would never “permit an injunction against publishing 
information about government plans or operations.”72 But in this 
case, Justice White concluded that the government had failed to meet 
the “unusually heavy justification [required] under the First Amend-
ment.”73 In summary, for Justices Stewart, Marshall, and White it 
was of vital significance that Congress had not passed a law that au-
thorized enjoining the press. The Court could not, and should not, act 
in the absence of law. Therefore, under the First Amendment, the 
only resolution possible was to deny the injunctive relief sought by 
the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 69.  Id. at 735–36 (White, J., concurring) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2006)). 
 70.  Id. at 737. 
 71.  Id. at 732. 
 72.  Id. at 731; see also id. at 731 n.1 (reasoning that “Congress has authorized a strain 
of prior restraints against private parties in certain instances.”). 
 73.  Id. at 733. 
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III. JUSTICES HARLAN 
AND BLACKMUN AND CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: DISSENT 
AND DEFERENCE 
 
 Justices Harlan and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger dis-
sented.74 What was their opinion with regard to the judicial role 
when government seeks to restrain the press in the name of national 
security? Justice Harlan insisted the judicial role was limited.75 This 
conclusion was based on the doctrine of separation of powers and on 
the executive’s “constitutional primacy in the field of foreign         
affairs.”76 However, according to Justice Harlan, the courts should 
still do two things. First, “the judiciary must review the initial Execu-
tive determination to the point of satisfying itself that the subject 
matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of the Presi-
dent’s foreign relations power.”77 For Justice Harlan, the ultimate 
decision rested with the Executive.78 Second, the judiciary had to be 
assured by the head of the relevant executive department that na-
tional security would be irreparably damaged.79 In the Pentagon Pa-
pers case, that head would be the Secretary of State or the Secretary 
of Defense. One would have to give his personal consideration to the 
issue. 
 However, he wrote, the judiciary should not “go beyond these 
two inquiries and redetermine for itself the probable impact of dis-
closure on the national security.”80 Justice Harlan did not believe that 
the “opinions of either the District Court or the Court of Appeals in 
the Post litigation” gave the deference that should be given to the ex-
ecutive branch in the field of foreign affairs.81 However, Justice 
Harlan still believed there was a role in a Pentagon Papers-type case 
for the judiciary. The courts must be assured that the executive has 
seriously considered the national security issue and found it of suffi-
cient gravity to warrant a restraint on the press.82 Of course, this very 
 
 74.  Id. at 752. 
 75.  Id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 757. 
 78.  Id. at 757–58. 
 79.  Id. at 757. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 758. 
 82.  Id. at 758–59. 
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limited review provides only slight protection for First Amendment 
interests. Certainly, it would be a rare Secretary of State or Secretary 
of Defense who would say after the Attorney General has authorized 
a request for injunctive relief against the press that national security 
concerns did not warrant the restraint. Indeed, as a result of the lim-
ited scope of the judicial role as Justice Harlan conceived it, there is 
no need for the Court to actually examine the documents or data at 
issue. 
 If we compare Justice Harlan’s opinion to those of two Jus-
tices in the majority—Justices Stewart and White—we see that they 
too would have given a good deal of deference to the Executive if 
there had been a statute authorizing injunctive relief against the pub-
lication of classified or confidential government documents. How-
ever, it is questionable whether they would have limited the judicial 
role to the extent advocated by Justice Harlan. Indeed, the full meas-
ure of the deference that Justice Harlan would have extended to the 
executive is demonstrated by his dissent.83 If Justice Harlan’s view 
had prevailed, the injunction below would have been upheld despite 
the presumption of invalidity, which First Amendment law had tradi-
tionally attached to prior restraints. 
 Justice Blackmun’s opinion criticized the very limited time 
with which the lower courts and the Supreme Court were given to 
deal with the great issues presented.84 Justice Blackmun thought 
these cases should be remanded so that standards could be developed 
for evaluating “the broad right of the press to print and . . . the very 
narrow right of the government to prevent.”85 He wrote that after 
studying the material, he shared the government’s concerns that pub-
lication of the Papers would cause “the death of soldiers, the destruc-
tion of alliances” and difficulties “negotiat[ing] with our enemies.”86 
 Justice Blackmun’s opinion is far removed from the opinions 
of Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. Indeed, Blackmun ob-
served that “[t]he First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an 
 
 83.  Id. at 756–58 (concluding that the Constitution grants exclusive jurisdiction over 
decisions of foreign policy to the executive and legislative branches). 
 84.  Id. at 759–62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that under other circumstances, 
with a case of this importance, he would have remanded). 
 85.  Id. at 761. 
 86.  Id. at 762–63 (quoting United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1330 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 943, aff’d sub nom. Penta-
gon Papers, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)). 
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entire Constitution.”87 Justice Blackmun was very clear—at least in 
this early phase of his service on the Supreme Court—that he could 
not “subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First 
amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions.”88 Finally, it 
should be noted that in making his decision to dissent, he emphasized 
that he had read some of the documents at issue.89 However, he did 
not make clear whether he thought such judicial consideration of the 
documents at issue should be a requirement. His colleague, Justice 
Harlan, for example, did not think it was a requirement.90 
 In his opinion Chief Justice Burger complained, as had Jus-
tices Harlan and Blackmun, that the case came before the courts with 
unseemly speed.91 The New York Times had possession of the Penta-
gon Papers for months.92 The courts and the government were re-
quired to confront the issues in this case within a far tighter time-
frame. The Chief Justice thought the Times should have given the 
government an opportunity to review the Pentagon Papers. 93 The 
Times should have tried to reach an agreement with the government 
on what should and what should not be published. The Chief Justice 
wrote that although he was in general agreement with Justices Harlan 
and Blackmun, he was “not prepared to reach the merits.”94 
 Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Blackmun in reasoning 
that “the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute.”95 The 
Chief Justice complained that “only those judges to whom the First 
Amendment is absolute and permits of no restraint in any circum-
stance or for any reason, are really in a position to act[.]”96 However, 
for those like him who did not share this view, the problem was: 
“[w]e do not know the facts of the cases.”97 Neither did the judges on 
the District Court or the Courts of Appeals. In such circumstances, 
 
 87.  Id. at 761. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 762. 
 90.  See id. at 756–58 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding once the executive deter-
mined that the subject matter was within his foreign relations power, the judiciary’s role in 
matters of foreign affairs was limited to reviewing that decision). 
 91.  Id. at 748–49 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 92.  Id. at 750. 
 93.  Id. at 751. 
 94.  Id. at 752. 
 95.  Id. at 749. 
 96.  Id. at 748. 
 97.  Id. 
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Chief Justice Burger agreed with the Second Circuit that the case 
should be remanded.98 
 The Blackmun and Burger opinions in the Pentagon Papers 
case do not directly confront or consider in any detail the role of the 
judiciary with respect to collisions between the First Amendment and 
national security. However, at least implicitly, I think there is some 
disagreement between Burger and Blackmun, on the one hand, and 
Harlan on the other. I think both Burger and Blackmun thought 
judges should review the material themselves. Indeed, their opinions 
are bitter that they did not have an opportunity to do this. Justice 
Harlan, however, is clear that if the Court is assured by the executive 
that the national security issue is very serious and requires restraint, 
such review is not required. 
 
IV.  SUMMING UP: THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NINE OPINIONS 
 
 In summary, all the Justices in the Pentagon Papers case 
thought there should be some judicial role in deciding whether the 
government can enjoin the press in the interest of national security. 
However, there was a vast difference of opinion among the Justices 
on the nature of that role. For Justice Hugo Black it was the very es-
sence of the judicial function to strike down injunctions against the 
press obtained by the government.99 For Justice Harlan, the judicial 
function was far more limited. If foreign affairs or national security 
were involved, the judiciary should only extend minimal oversight 
even where serious First Amendment issues were presented.100 The 
other Justices in the Pentagon Papers case fell into intermediate po-
sitions—some closer to the First Amendment absolutism of Justice 
Black, others closer to the concerns expressed by Justice Harlan as to 
the extent that judicial oversight should be permissible when the ex-
ecutive believes the nation’s defense or foreign relations are threat-
ened. 
 Alexander Bickel, the lawyer for the New York Times in the 
Pentagon Papers case, captured the divergences in opinion among 
Supreme Court Justices in First Amendment cases such as this one 
when he wrote, 
 
 98.  Id. at 752. 
 99.  Id. at 714–15 (Black, J., concurring). 
 100.  Id. at 756–57 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Actually, ambiguity . . . is, if not the theory, at any 
rate the condition of the First Amendment in the law 
of our Constitution. Nothing is more characteristic of 
the law of the First Amendment—not the rhetoric, but 
the actual law of it—than the Supreme Court’s re-
sourceful efforts to cushion rather than resolve clashes 
between the First Amendment and interests conflict-
ing with it.101 
 
It is, therefore, illustrative of the observations made that Justices 
Stewart, White, and perhaps Marshall as well, have declined to say 
that they would never uphold injunctions against the press, under any 
circumstances. More surprising, however, is another observation 
from Professor Bickel. 
 
[A]s I conceive the contest established by the First 
Amendment, and as the Supreme Court of the United 
States appeared to conceive it in the Pentagon Papers 
case, the presumptive duty of the press is to publish, 
not to guard security or to be concerned with the mor-
als of its sources.102 
 
I would like to think that the foregoing statement is what the Penta-
gon Papers case stands for. However, as I have analyzed the opin-
ions of the Justices in that case, it seems that only four—Black, 
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall—really subscribed to it. Certainly, 
the dissenters—Harlan, Burger, and Blackmun—did not. Further-
more, I am not sure that Stewart and White would have subscribed to 
this statement either. They, like Marshall, were concerned with the 
absence of statutory authority. However, the refusal of Congress to 
enact such a law either then or now is an indication that Professor 
Bickel’s statement that the “duty of the press is to publish, not to 
guard security”103 reflects a national understanding of the meaning of 
the First Amendment. 
 
 
 
 101.  ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 78 (1st ed. 1975). 
 102.  Id. at 81. 
 103.  Id. 
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V. THE WIKILEAKS 
CONTROVERSY 
 
 Let us now move from the Pentagon Papers case to the 
WikiLeaks controversy. WikiLeaks is a website founded by an Aus-
tralian citizen, Julian Assange, who resided in Sweden at the time his 
website became famous.104 In July 2010, WikiLeaks released over 
75,000 classified military documents concerning six years of U.S. 
military records and operations in Afghanistan.105 Julian Assange 
heralded the event as equivalent to “opening the files of East Ger-
many’s secret Stasi police.”106 Subsequently, he posted 15,000 more 
documents.107 Taking a more somber view, U.S. National Security 
Adviser General James Jones warned that release of such classified 
information “could put the lives of Americans and [its] partners at 
risk[.]”108 WikiLeaks gave the material to some traditional major 
media in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and else-
where (i.e., the New York Times, the Guardian Der Spiegel, Le 
Monde, and El Pais, respectively).109 Unlike the original file dump 
on the WikiLeaks site, the Guardian and the New York Times re-
ported that they had “spent weeks cross-checking the informa-
tion.”110 
 WikiLeaks describes itself as a public forum for whistle-
blowers to expose government and corporate wrongdoing that has 
 
 104.    See John F. Burns & Eric Schmitt, Sweden Adds to Drama over Founder of 
WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at A6. 
 105.  See Charlie Savage, Gates Assails WikiLeaks Over Release Of Reports, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2010, at A8 (explaining the reaction of the U.S. Secretary of Defense to the 
release of 75,000 documents); Unvarnished Look at a Hamstrung Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 
26, 2010, at A1 (justifying the newspaper’s participation in the release of a six-year archive 
of classified documents). 
 106.  Wikileaks Says Evidence of War Crimes in Documents, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 
26, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 14917755. 
 107.  Burns & Schmitt, supra note 104. 
 108.  Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of Na-
tional Security Advisor General James Jones on Wikileaks (July 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-national-security-advisor-general-
james-jones-wikileaks. 
 109.    Russell Adams & Jessica E. Vascellaro, To Publish Leaks or Not to Publish?, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703785704575643431883607708.html 
 110.  Afghanistan War Leak Papers Will Take ‘Weeks to Assess,’ BBC NEWS (July 27, 
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10770682. 
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been kept under the cover of classified or confidential material.111 
Not everyone subscribes to this interpretation of WikiLeaks. Human 
rights groups in Afghanistan as well as the Paris-based non-profit or-
ganization Reporters Without Borders expressed concern about Jul-
ian Assange’s posting of U.S. military records in Afghanistan.112 
Names of individuals appeared in the first batch of files posted by 
WikiLeaks, thereby placing those individuals at risk.113 The Secre-
tary General of Reporters Without Borders said WikiLeaks’s actions 
showed “incredible irresponsibility” in posting unfiltered classified 
U.S. military records online.114 Giving some force to these claims, 
the Pentagon charged that the posted documents “disclosed the 
names of Afghans who collaborate with the U.S. military.”115 De-
fending his actions, Assange responded, “We believe the way to jus-
tice is transparency, and we are clear that the end goal is to expose 
injustices in the world and try to rectify them.”116 
 On Friday, October 22, 2010, the WikiLeaks website released 
more than 390,000 documents on the Iraq war.117 Many of the docu-
ments provide detailed accounts of detainee abuse carried out by 
 
 111.  About: What is WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.ch/About.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2011). 
 112.  Adam Levine, Rights Groups Express Concerns About WikiLeaks, CNN.COM 
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-
10/us/wikileaks.rights.groups_1_wikileaks-julian-assange-rights-groups; see Jean-Francois 
Julliard, Open Letter to WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange: “A Bad Precedent for the In-
ternet’s Future,” REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRS (Aug. 12, 2010), http://en.rsf.org/united-
states-open-letter-to-wikileaks-founder-12-08-2010,38130.html (describing the disclosure of 
military informants’ names as “highly dangerous” and “irresponsible”). 
 113.  E.g., Eric Schmitt & Charlie Savage, Pentagon Studies Risks to Afghans From 
Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at A1. 
 114.  Julliard, supra note 112. While Reporters Without Borders has decried some of 
WikiLeaks’s practices as irresponsible, that organization has also staunchly defended 
WikiLeaks’s promotion of transparency and has criticized efforts by foreign governments to 
sabotage the WikiLeaks website. 
 115.  Scott Horton, WikiLeaks: The National-Security State Strikes Back, HARPER’S 
MAG. (Aug. 3, 2010, 11:25 AM), http://harpers.org/archive/2010/08/hbc-90007466. 
 116.  Ellen Nakashima & Joey Warrick, WikiLeaks Flexes Some Muscle, WASH. POST, 
July 26, 2010, at A1. A disenchanted former close associate of Julian Assange observes—in 
a book providing an insider’s perspective on WikiLeaks—that transparency may be in the 
eye of the beholder: “Someone who criticizes the fact that secrets always remain in the 
hands of a chosen few with power must answer the question of whether his publishing strat-
egy truly makes them accessible to everyone. Is it not the case—that with the cables only 
the guardians of the secrets are being replaced?” DANIEL DOMSCHEIT–BERG, INSIDE 
WIKILEAKS: MY TIME WITH JULIAN ASSANGE AT THE WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS WEBSITE 
267 (2011). 
 117.  Greg Miller & Peter Finn, Secret Iraq War Files Offer Grim New Details, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 23, 2010, at A1. 
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Iraqi personnel. However, unlike the release of the Afghanistan war 
documents, WikiLeaks redacted locations and names.118 WikiLeaks 
gave “advance access” of this material to the New York Times, the 
Qatar satellite television network, Al-Jazeera, Der Spiegel in Ger-
many, the Paris newspaper, Le Monde, the British newspaper, the 
Guardian, and Channel 4 in the United Kingdom.119 
 The October 22, 2010 WikiLeaks posting shows the influence 
of the established press on new media. In that posting, WikiLeaks 
followed the press practice of redacting names.120 Arguably, this 
could improve a website like WikiLeaks’s claim to be treated as part 
of the press and to be entitled, therefore, to the same protections ac-
corded to the traditional press.121 However, WikiLeaks’s most con-
troversial posting was yet to come. 
 On Sunday November 28, 2010, WikiLeaks disclosed 
250,000 diplomatic cables exposing “years of U.S. foreign policy 
maneuvering that could prove embarrassing” to the United States and 
its allies.122 Major newspapers in the U.S. and Europe—the New 
York Times (U.S.), the Guardian (U.K.), Der Spiegel (Germany), El 
Pais (Spain), and Le Monde (France)—were given access to the ma-
terial in advance of its appearance on the WikiLeaks website.123 The 
New York Times began publishing the substance of the cables the 
next day, November 29.124 The Times told its readers that it received 
the cables from a source it did not disclose, but explained that the ca-
bles were “originally obtained by WikiLeaks.”125 It is possible the 
“source” actually serves as a kind of straw man. This third-party ap-
proach would counter a charge that the Times and WikiLeaks were 
acting in concert. Such an approach might also help to resist an as-
sertion that any legal liability that WikiLeaks faced was also shared 
by the Times. 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Mary Turck, War Secrets, WikiLeaks and Journalism, DAILY PLANET, July 25, 
2010, http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/blog/mary-turck/war-secrets-wikileaks-and-journalism. 
 122.  Jay Solomon, Adam Entous, & Julian E. Barnes, Vast Leak Discloses Diplomatic 
Secrets, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 29, 2010, at A1. 
 123.  Id. at A2. 
 124.  See Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer a Raw Look Inside 
U.S. Diplomacy: Dispatches Chronicle Threats and Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at 
A1. 
 125.  Bill Kelly, A Note To Readers: The Decision to Publish Diplomatic Documents, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A8. 
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 The Times told readers it had taken care to ensure the mate-
rial published from the diplomatic cables did not include information 
that “would endanger confidential informants or compromise na-
tional security.”126 The Times said it shared its redactions with 
WikiLeaks in hopes that WikiLeaks would follow suit.127 Before 
publishing, the Times then contacted the Obama administration and 
informed it of the cables they planned to publish and asked the ad-
ministration to indicate if any of that material would jeopardize the 
national interest.128  
 It should be remembered that this was exactly what was not 
done in the Pentagon Papers affair. The Times published the Penta-
gon Papers without giving the government an advance look at what it 
planned to publish. The New York Times did not give the Nixon ad-
ministration an opportunity to say what should be included and what 
should be excluded in the interest of national security. Indeed, Chief 
Justice Burger complained bitterly in his dissent that this should have 
been done.129 In short, the New York Times cooperated with the 
Obama administration about the WikiLeaks publication of the dip-
lomatic cables to a far greater extent than it did with the Nixon ad-
ministration concerning publication of the Pentagon Papers. The 
Times voluntarily adopted a procedure, which if it had been required 
to adopt by statute, would have been the essence of a prior restraint. 
 The Obama administration responded negatively to the offer 
of the Times to indicate what part of the material in the diplomatic 
cables they would like excised. First, the administration said it was 
opposed to publication of any of the diplomatic cables.130 Apparently 
upon realizing that this position was not going to be accepted by the 
Times, the administration then suggested additional redactions, some 
of which the Times did accept.131 Furthermore, the Times said it 
would forward the administration’s objections regarding publication 
of some of the material that appeared in the diplomatic cables not 
only “to other news organizations” but also, “at the suggestion of the 
State Department[,] to WikiLeaks itself.”132 
 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713, 750–51 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 130.  Kelly, supra note 125. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
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VI. THE ARREST AND 
PROSECUTION OF JULIAN ASSANGE 
 
 After the release of the confidential or classified material de-
scribed above, Assange’s legal troubles began. The Swedish gov-
ernment issued an arrest warrant for Assange based on sexual assault 
charges that had been filed against him there.133 Assange went into 
hiding and the Swedes turned the matter over to Interpol.134 Assange 
denied the charges and said they were “part of an elaborate plot to 
silence WikiLeaks.”135 On December 7, 2010, Assange surrendered 
to British authorities in London.136 After considering a request by the 
Swedish government for the extradition of Assange, a British judge 
found Assange to be a flight risk, denied his request for bail, and or-
dered him jailed.137 Eventually, Assange’s request for bail was 
granted.138 On February 24, 2011, a British judge approved an extra-
dition request from the Swedish government that Assange will ap-
peal.139 
 Certainly, Assange’s arrest for an alleged sexual offense 
rather than for disclosure on WikiLeaks of confidential and classified 
material involving many governments is a surprise. Earlier Attorney 
General Eric Holder announced that the Justice Department was con-
sidering prosecuting those responsible for publishing classified or 
confidential material about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
later, the State Department cables.140 Indeed, Attorney General 
Holder confirmed that the Department of Justice was specifically 
considering whether Assange “could be charged with a crime.”141 
Clearly, for the United states, the obstacles to a successful prosecu-
 
 133.  Anthony Faiola, Assange in Talks to Come Out of Hiding, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 
2010, at A11. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  John F. Burns & Ravi Somaiya, WikiLeaks Founder Is Jailed in Britain in Swed-
ish Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010, at A1. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Ravi Somaiya, Freed on Bail, WikiLeaks Founder Offers Defiant Note, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at A13. 
 139.  Jeremy Kirk, British Judge Approves WikiLeaks’ Assange Extradition, PCWORLD, 
Feb. 25, 2011, http://www.pcworld.com/article/220561. 
 140.  Ashby Jones, U.S. Faces Hard Bid to Prosecute Leakers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 
2010, at A11. 
 141.  Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but Legal Schol-
ars Warn of Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A13. 
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tion of Assange are many. First, Assange, an Australian citizen, is 
not a citizen or resident of the United States.142 Furthermore, if As-
sange is extradited to Sweden, that country may refuse extradition if 
the request is politically motivated.143 
 Baruch Weiss, the lawyer for one of the lobbyist defendants 
in the AIPAC case,144 has discussed why leaks cases are so difficult 
for the government.145 For one thing, Mr. Weiss points out that there 
is no general federal statute making the disclosure of classified in-
formation illegal.146 He explains why this is so. 
 
When Congress tried to enact such a statute [i.e., a 
general law prohibiting the disclosure of classified in-
formation] President Bill Clinton sensibly vetoed it. 
His reason: The government suffers from such an 
overclassification problem—some intelligence agen-
cies classify even newspaper articles—that a law of 
this sort would end up criminalizing the disclosure of 
innocuous information.147 
 
VII. PROSECUTING 
JULIAN ASSANGE UNDER THE ESPIONAGE ACT? 
 
 One option that has been suggested is that prosecution might 
lie under the Espionage Act.148 As I noted earlier in my discussion of 
the Pentagon Papers case, several of the Justices in that case consid-
ered whether it was possible that a criminal prosecution might lie 
against the newspaper publishers who published the Pentagon Papers 
even though they could not support the government’s request for an 
 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Baruch Weiss, Prosecuting WikiLeaks? Good Luck, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at 
B2. 
 144.    United States v. Rosen, 557 F. 3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (denying defendants’ mo-
tion to dismiss on their charges of disclosing national defense information); see also Jerry 
Markon, U.S. Drops Case Against Ex-Lobbyists, Wash. Post, May 2, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/01/ 
AR2009050101310.html. 
 145.  Weiss, supra note 143. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Dianne Feinstein, Op-Ed., Prosecute Assange Under the Espionage Act, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 7, 2010, at A19. 
V._JB_FINAL READ_NT'L SEC. & FA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2011  11:10 AM 
68 WAKE FOREST JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:1 
injunction in the absence of a statute.149 They took this position be-
cause they believed the Espionage Act might have supported a 
criminal prosecution. However, legal commentators question 
whether an Espionage Act could ever be successfully used against 
Assange.150 At least two issues beset such a prosecution. First, can 
the U.S. government prove that Assange’s actions meet the specific 
intent requirement of the Act? Second, are Assange’s postings on 
WikiLeaks protected by the First Amendment? 
 
                   a. The Specific Intent Issue 
  
 The Espionage Act is a rather ancient statute at this point. 
Enacted in 1917, it is nearly one hundred years old. By today’s First 
Amendment standards, the language of many of its prohibitions are 
vague and overbroad.151 No successful prosecution against a news 
organization has even been brought under the Act. The specific in-
tent requirement of the Act may be a real obstacle to a successful 
prosecution of Assange.  
 A recent case is illustrative. Two officials of AIPAC, a pro-
Israel lobbying group, were indicted under a provision of the Espio-
nage Act, for conspiring to transmit information relating to the na-
tional defense to those not entitled to receive it.152 The defense filed 
a motion to dismiss the indictment, which was denied.153 Ultimately, 
the prosecution was dropped by the U.S. government before the 
trial.154 In the AIPAC case, Judge Ellis, who declined to dismiss the 
indictment brought under the Espionage Act by the government,155 
nonetheless declared at the same time that a successful prosecution 
under the Act had to meet a specific intent requirement. 
“[I]nformation relating to the national defense, whether tangible or 
intangible, must necessarily be information which if disclosed is po-
tentially harmful to the United States, and the defendant must know 
 
 149.  See supra Part V. 
 150.  Savage, supra note 141. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  United States v. Rosen, 557 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 153.  United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 602 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 
192 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 154.  Weiss, supra note 143. 
 155.  Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 602. 
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that disclosure of the information is potentially harmful to the United 
States.”156 
 Furthermore, it should be mentioned that before the diplo-
matic cables were posted Assange went to the State Department and 
asked what redactions they would like to make.157 The State Depart-
ment refused to cooperate.158 It might therefore be difficult at least in 
respect to the postings of the diplomatic cables to prove that he 
knowingly intended to harm the United States. One would expect his 
defense counsel to argue that his actions prove the contrary. 
 
b. Is WikiLeaks Protected by Freedom of the Press? 
 
 The second issue is the First Amendment problem the 
WikiLeaks postings present. Even if the specific intent requirement 
of the Espionage Act is met, the prosecution of Assange for 
WikiLeaks’s posting would still have to survive a First Amendment 
challenge. Assange would certainly insist that his WikiLeaks posting 
should be protected under the First Amendment’s guarantee of free-
dom of the press.159 If Assange were prosecuted for his WikiLeaks 
postings, it is most likely he would insist that the WikiLeaks website 
is part of the press. Baruch Weiss points out that neither the Wash-
ington Post nor the New York Times is being investigated for publi-
cation of the same material which Julian Assange posted on 
WikiLeaks.160 The reason for this is clear: the First Amendment 
freedom of the press guarantee. Weiss says Justice Department prac-
tice has been to “refrain from bringing leaks indictments against tra-
ditional media outlets.”161 Yet Julian Assange is being investigated. 
Weiss suggests that “Holder may feel emboldened to move against 
WikiLeaks because it does not have the look or feel of traditional 
news media.”162 
 
 156.  Id. at 641. 
 157.  Weiss, supra note 143. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See Bill Dedman, U.S. v. WikiLeaks: Espionage and the First Amendment, 
MSNBC.COM, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40653249/ns/us_news-wikileaks_in_security 
(explaining the view that WikiLeaks qualifies as a media source that should receive First 
Amendment protection). 
 160.  Weiss, supra note 143. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
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 Is WikiLeaks part of the press? Today, some bloggers receive 
press passes and participate in presidential news conferences.163 The 
WikiLeaks website exists in order to dispense information. However, 
some, like Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, contend that As-
sange is “no journalist” but is instead an “agitator intent on damaging 
our government, whose policies he happens to disagree with, regard-
less of who gets hurt.”164 The test of its claim to First Amendment 
protection is certainly not whether governments or society at large 
approve of the information that it chooses to disseminate. Therefore, 
the case for excluding WikiLeaks from the protection afforded by the 
freedom of the press guarantee has to be because its content is trans-
mitted on the Internet rather than through the printed pages of daily 
newspapers. To state this argument is to refute it. This argument is 
particularly weak in a case such as WikiLeaks when traditional me-
dia outlets have been working so closely with WikiLeaks.165 Their 
cooperation has only served to increase the reach of the WikiLeaks 
postings. 
 Ultimately, the WikiLeaks postings demonstrate an interac-
tion between WikiLeaks and the established press. It is first a story 
of competition and then ultimately of cooperation. When the first 
postings of material concerning the Afghanistan War were posted on 
WikiLeaks, the reaction of the newspaper press was critical.166 Spe-
cifically, the press complained. Names of soldiers and other person-
nel had been revealed, and the press reported people’s lives were put 
in danger.167 However, by the time of WikiLeaks’s posting of files 
concerning Iraq, and later releases of diplomatic cables, WikiLeaks 
made redactions. The press praised the fact that WikiLeaks was mak-
 
 163.  See Peter Baker, How a Blogger’s News Conference Query Came About, N.Y 
TIMES, June 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/us/politics/26baker.html (illus-
trating the Obama administration’s innovative treatment of bloggers by issuing press cre-
dentials and occasionally calling on bloggers for the honor of the first question at press con-
ferences). 
 164.  Feinstein, supra note 148. 
 165.  E.g., Brett J. Blackledge & Jamey Keaten, Respected Media Outlets Collaborate 
with WikiLeaks, ABCNEWS.COM, Dec. 3, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12302107 (noting “extraordinary collabora-
tion” between respected media outlets and WikiLeaks). 
 166.  See, e.g., Susan Page, Papers Detail the Scope of a Tense, Difficult War, USA 
TODAY, July 27, 2010, at A1 (questioning whether the amount of and detail in posted mate-
rial would increase growing unease about the war). 
 167.  See, e.g., David Martin, Pentagon: WikiLeaks Endangers Soldiers, Afghans, CBS 
NEWS.COM, July 29, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/29/eveningnews/main6725935.shtml. 
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ing redactions itself.168 The press was given advance access to the 
material posted by WikiLeaks at the outset.169 Instead of competing 
with and scooping the newspaper press, WikiLeaks had apparently 
decided to cooperate with established press. Indeed, WikiLeaks had 
become a kind of press adjunct. But, of course, the fact that Julian 
Assange and WikiLeaks, if prosecuted, will make a First Amend-
ment defense does not mean they will prevail. 
 In cases such as this, “rigorous scrutiny” is applied but a 
compelling government interest may trump First Amendment con-
siderations.170 In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme 
Court ruled that, under the facts of the case, national security and 
foreign affairs considerations should prevail over First Amendment 
claims.171 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Supreme Court ma-
jority, gave the First Amendment claimants the benefit of the strict 
scrutiny standard of review, but then wrote that the Court would de-
fer to the government’s assessment of the facts as to whether the na-
tional security and foreign affairs interests of the United States were 
endangered.172  Yet such deference deprives the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review of the protection it is designed to afford. It is entirely 
plausible that such an approach might be taken if Assange was 
prosecuted in the United States for postings that arguably jeopard-
ized national security and interfered with the United States’ relation-
ships with other countries. 
 
VIII. WIKILEAKS AND 
THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE COMPARED 
 
 What parallels can we draw between the Pentagon Papers 
case and WikiLeaks? The two cases are hardly exact parallels. For 
one thing, in the Pentagon Papers case the government was seeking 
to enjoin publications. The government was therefore asking for the 
 
 168.  See, e.g., Larry Shaughnessy, WikiLeaks Redacted More Information in Latest 
Documents Release, CNN.COM, Oct. 22, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-
22/us/wikileaks.editing_1_wikileaks-founder-julian-assange-redacted-documents. 
 169.  E.g., Blackledge & Keaten, supra note 165. 
 170.  See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (citation 
omitted). 
 171.  Id. at 2730 (holding that while other statutes relating to speech and terrorism may 
not pass First Amendment review, the statute in Holder did not violate the First Amend-
ment. 
 172.  Id. at 2727. 
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imposition of a prior restraint. In that context, the press received the 
benefit of the “heavy presumption” against prior restraints.173 How-
ever, in the WikiLeaks controversy, the discussion centers on the 
possibility of a criminal prosecution against Julian Assange and there 
is no equivalent “heavy presumption” against such a prosecution. 
There are, of course, some parallels. In each case, the actual 
leaker was arrested—Private First Class Bradley Manning, a soldier 
working for U.S. Army intelligence in the WikiLeaks case,174 and 
Daniel Ellsberg, a Rand employee, in the Pentagon Papers case.175  
However, in the Pentagon Papers case, the newspaper pub-
lishers were not prosecuted. Assange has not yet been the subject of 
a U.S. criminal prosecution, but it may happen. Some aspects of his 
situation may be helpful to him. Assange is not a U.S. citizen; he 
lives abroad and his website was not established in the United States. 
However, from the perspective of a prosecutor, the case has some fa-
vorable aspects as well. The newspaper press is obviously an ad-
dressee of the First Amendment. An issue remains as to whether a 
website such as WikiLeaks is part of that press. Furthermore,        
Assange and WikiLeaks seek to challenge the very idea and practice 
of government secrets altogether. Such a claim is unlikely to receive 
full First Amendment protection. 
 
 
 
 173.  Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
 174.  Peter Grier, Soldier Arrested in WikiLeaks Classified Iraq Video Case, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, June 7, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0607/Soldier-
arrested-in-WikiLeaks-classified-Iraq-video-case. 
 175.  SUSAN A. BREWER, WHY AMERICA FIGHTS: PATRIOTISM AND WAR PROPAGANDA 
FROM THE PHILIPPINES TO IRAQ 218 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009). 
